[nSLUG] Nasty zero day vulnerability in openssl CVE-2014-0160
julien.savoie at usainteanne.ca
Tue Apr 8 21:23:05 ADT 2014
On 08/04/14 08:59 PM, Mike Doherty wrote:
> You should consider using perfect forward secrecy if you don't already
> do so. Without PFS, any traffic over the past 2 years (since the bug was
> introduced into OpenSSL) can be decrypted if the private key is
> compromised today. With PFS, that's not the case.
Once your private key is lost you're in trouble. Even if the traffic
was encrypted with an entirely non-vulnerable version of openssl.
The vulnerability was introduced 2 years ago, but once the private key
has been compromised you can go back as far as you like (2 years not
withstanding) and decrypt traffic provided it was encrypted with the
compromised private key, and it was non-PFS. For example, if your
private key is 4 years old and someone captured non-PFS traffic sent to
your server 4 years ago, they can now decrypt it. That is assuming
they've used heartbeat overruns to extract your private key, or any
other mechanism for that matter.
Even if the private key was generated with openssl 0.9.8 and lost with
1.0.1, the traffic encrypted with 0.9.8 is vulnerable to decryption.
Even with PFS, once your private key has been compromised you maybe
freely MITM'ed. Revoking and re-issuing doesn't necessarily stop MITM
if the browser isn't checking to see if the certificate has been revoked.
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